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Covid-19 has accelerated the world into the future. Here are five powerful forces that were at work before ­Covid-19, that intensified during the pandemic and will still affect the world in 2025, and far beyond.

First, technology. The march of computing and communications technology continues to reshape lives and the economy. Now, broadband communications, together with Zoom and similar videoconferencing software, has made it possible for a huge number of people to work from home.

By 2025, it is likely that some, possibly most, of this shift from offices will have reversed. But it will not do so completely. People will be able (and allowed) to work away from the office. Inevitably, this will not only include workers in their home countries, but workers sourced from abroad, too, usually on lower salaries. The result is likely to be a destabilising increase in what might be called “virtual immigration”.

Second, inequality. Many higher-paid office workers have been able to work from home, while most others could not. In western countries, many of those most adversely affected are also members of ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, many of the those already successful and powerful have prospered mightily.

Chart shows US job losses in Covid-19 crisis and Great Recession, by ethnicity, gender, age and education (%) showing Minorities, women, young people and the less-educated have been more likely to lose their jobs

The likelihood is that the inequalities exacerbated in the pandemic will not have reduced by 2025. The forces that have entrenched it are too powerful. Modest amelioration is the most one can expect. This, in turn, suggests that the populist politics of the recent past will continue to shape politics in 2025.

Third, indebtedness. Aggregate indebtedness has grown almost everywhere over the past four decades. Whenever crises have interrupted the private sector’s ability to borrow, governments have taken up the slack. This happened after the global financial crisis and again during Covid-19.

chart shows global debt, as a % of GDP, by sector showing debt has soared in the Covid-19 global economic crisis

The pandemic has dramatically increased borrowing by private and public sectors. According to the Institute for International Finance, the ratio of global gross debt to world output jumped from an already high 321 per cent at the end of 2019 to 362 per cent at the end of June 2020. Such a huge and sudden jump has not previously occurred in peacetime.

Fortunately, government debt is now extremely cheap, with nominal and real interest rates on the sovereign debt of high-income economies at low levels. But their debt overhangs may cripple parts of the private sector for years.

Fourth, deglobalisation. The plausible future is not that international exchange is going to die. But it is likely to become more regional and more virtual.

After the global financial crisis, trade ceased to grow faster than world output, as it had done in previous decades, but grew roughly in line with world output, instead. This slowdown was due to the exhaustion of opportunities, the absence of global trade liberalisation and rising protectionism. Covid-19 reinforced these trends. A marked result has been a desire to shift supply chains back home, or at least out of China.

The crisis is also reinforcing regionalism, notably in Asia. A noteworthy recent example has been agreement on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which brings together the 10 members of Asean with Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

Chart shows imports from China as a % of total US imports and imports from US as a % of total Chinese imports showing US-China trade fell during the Trump presidency

Finally, political tensions. One dimension has been a decline in the credibility of liberal democracy, the rise of demagogic authoritarianism in many countries and the rising power of China’s bureaucratic despotism. Another is the rise of populism in core western countries and especially the US. While the victory of Joseph Biden represents a defeat for populism, president Donald Trump’s large share of the vote shows it has not disappeared.

The World Ahead: an FT-Nikkei special report

FT and Nikkei journalists look ahead to the next five years after a five-year alliance marked by tumultuous events, from Brexit and the Trump presidency to the coronavirus pandemic. Other articles include:

  • FT and Nikkei sectoral experts forecast what work, finance, tech, retail and energy will look like in 2025

  • Ryosuke Harada, Nikkei senior executive editor, on what the rise of China means for the rest of the world

  • A visual guide to the data shaping the 2020s and beyond

  • We asked for your predictions: a woman in the White House, yes, but no progress on climate change

Yet perhaps the most important of the geopolitical developments has been rising tension between the US and China. This is forcing countries to take sides. Again, Covid-19 has accelerated the drift apart. Mr Trump blamed China for the pandemic. Even if he is gone, many in the US share this point of view.

So where, given all this, might the world be in 2025? With luck, economies will have largely recovered from the pandemic. But most will be poorer than they would have been without it.

Yet perhaps the biggest challenge will demand a global co-operation that will not exist. Sustaining a dynamic world economy, preserving peace and managing the global commons were always going to be hard. But an era of populism and great power conflict will make this far more difficult.

We are in an era of turmoil. The pandemic has underlined this, but not created it. We need to rise to that occasion. The defeat of Donald Trump gives the world breathing space. But the challenges are huge. In 2025, many of them will still be there and, in all probability, even more so.

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